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The project of federalisation of the Republic of Moldova 
Igor Botan, 3 July 2003  
 
 
1. One year after the launch of the Kiev project 
 
One year ago, on 3 July 2002, the OSCE project on the resolution of the 
Transdnistrian conflict through the federalisation of the Republic of Moldova was 
launched in Kiev. The optimism of the authors of the project, who intended to see the 
conflict resolved by the end of 2002, has taken the public opinion by surprise. During 
the 10 years while the conflict has been frozen on the two banks of the Nistru River 
two different state entities have been built. Therefore, one could hardly imagine that 
the existent status quo could be changed quickly. In addition, a number of experts 
believe that in Transdnistria multiple economic and other obscure interests held by 
various Moldovan and CIS neighbouring subjects and organisations converge.  
 
Judging by the articles of the OSCE project one could assume that Moldova was to be 
turned into a classical federation by the model of the Russian Federation. Likewise, 
Transdnistria was to be granted, as a result of Moldova's decentralisation, the status of 
federation subject; a delimitation of competencies between the federal centre and the 
subjects was to be worked out within the proposed federation. The things that have 
prompted most questions have been the lack of any indication as to the number of 
subjects that the proposed federation was to include, as well as the fact that the OSCE 
project was to have primacy over the Moldovan Constitution right after its signature 
by the President of Moldova and the leader of Tiraspol administration.  
 
Therefore, from the start, the OSCE project was subjected to criticism by the political 
opposition in Moldova, which, in its turn, was criticised by the official mass media for 
its adverse position. In reply, the opposition parties dedicated a special meeting of the 
Round Table with Permanent Status to the topic, during which they adopted a 
Proclamation envisaging a series of alternative actions for solving the conflict. 
Curiously, for a long period of time the Moldovan authorities avoided to express their 
own position with regard to the issue of federalisation of Moldova and have thus 
shown that they were interested to see the reaction of the opposition first.  
 
In Transdnistria things have been pretty clear since a long time. After the head of the 
Tiraspol foreign department expressed his positive view of the OSCE project, 
immediately after it was made public in Kiev, he fell into the disgrace of the 
Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov.  
 
It was only on the eve of the OSCE Summit in Porto in December 2002, when the 
Moldovan and Transdnistrian authorities were expected to express their official 
position with regard to the OSCE project, did things clear up a bit. First, it became 
clear that, in general terms, neither the Moldovan nor the Transdnistrian authorities 
approved of the OSCE project provisions, save for their principle agreement to solve 
the conflict through federalisation. This has manifested in the diplomatic victory of 
Tiraspol that succeeded, on the very eve of the Porto summit, to persuade the Head of 
the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the representatives of guarantors (Russia and 
Ukraine) to sign a protocol whereby they committed to support the creation of a 
"contractual federation" between two equal subjects: Moldova and Transdnistria. This  
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meant, in fact, giving up the initial OSCE draft, which allowed for granting 
Transdnistria the status of subject of federation through the de jure decentralisation of 
Moldova. De facto, Transdnistria has not been part of Moldova for a long time and, 
therefore, it was logical for the Transdnistrian leaders to invoke the provisions of the 
8 May 1997 Memorandum signed between Chisinau and Tiraspol, which refers to the 
equality of parties to the conflict. Hence the obsessive idea of building a "contractual 
federation" between two equal subjects.  
 
In consequence, only in February 2003, President Voronin overcame yet another 
critical stage and proposed to draft the new Constitution of the federation, together 
with Transdnistrian representatives. Thus, all that has been taken from the OSCE 
project was the notion of "federal state". However, as expected, the process of 
drafting the new constitution got into a stalemate. More than two months have passed 
since the constitution of the joint Moldovan-Transdnistrian commission tasked with 
the drafting of the Constitution, but the activity thereof remains blocked. A number of 
causes for this have been invoked, such as the lack of co-ordination in determining the 
number of representatives of the two parties, the working site etc. If such things have 
not been co-ordinated in advance, then neither were the principle of functioning and 
decision making of the commission. But these are purely functional problems, the 
important thing is that even if these issues had been settled well in advance, the 
commission would still have not been able to function normally. This is due to the 
simple reason that the "architects" of the new constitution have not been provided 
with the basic parameters of the new state entity that the two "beneficiaries" from 
Chisinau and Tiraspol would like to craft.  
 
On the one hand, both "beneficiaries" crafted in the territories controlled by them their 
own "vertical axes of power", which they do not want to give up. Therefore, it is 
practically impossible to make the two axes coaxial. Judging by all appearances, for 
President Voronin the reintegration of the country is synonymous with creating an 
"asymmetrical federation", that is annihilating the Tiraspol "vertical axis of power". 
For the Tiraspol leader, Igor Smirnov, the "common state" that is to be created by 
Moldova and Transdnistria on equal terms could be a "contractual federation" where 
there would not be much interference between the competencies of the two "vertical 
axes of power". The most curious thing is that following the May 2003 seminar 
organised by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly for Moldovan and Transdnistrian 
MPs, one of the deputy chairs of the Moldovan Parliament said that the most 
important conclusion of the seminar was that before starting to draft the federal 
constitution it is important for the parties to sign a "political document" to set by joing 
agreement the basic principles of the future Moldovan federation. Only then could the 
experts in the joint commission proceed with the drafting of the federative 
constitution itself. It would be naive to believe that before the OSCE seminar these 
things were not known. It is believed that the joint commission is but a cover that the 
parties to the conflict use until the changes in regional political configuration offers 
them new opportunities to impose their points of view.  
 
In the meantime, things are getting worse. The Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov 
threatens to stop co-operating with Moldova in solving the conflict. On 30 June 2003 
he addressed the Transdnistrian citizens and threatened to take measures in response 
to what he calls "economic blockade" by Moldova. From the point of view of the 
Tiraspol leaders, by "economic blockade" they mean the obligation of Transdnistrian  
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economic agents to respect the Moldovan customs rules for import-export operations 
and the requirement that the Transdnistrian economic agents register with the 
Moldovan Chamber of Commerce to be issued certificates certifying the country of 
origin of exported goods. From Smirnov's statements one can conclude that only out 
of "respect for the guarantors (Russia and Ukraine) and the OSCE" he does not block 
Moldova's transport and energy supply networks, as he did during the 1992 armed 
conflict. The Transdnistrian authorities have already blocked the process of 
withdrawal of the Russian army from the region, breaching Smirnov's decree on 
"ensuring the necessary measures for honouring by Russia of its obligation to 
withdraw its army from the eastern region of Moldova".  
 
 
2. Possible consequences of the new crisis 
 
In this extremely tense situation, the news about the recent meeting in Tiraspol of the 
Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov with the newly elect General Mayor of Chisinau 
Serafim Urechean is presented by the state TV channel as an act of undermining the 
political stability in the country. There are a number of reasons for such unhealthy 
reaction. Firstly, both Smirnov and Urechean are regarded as the main "political foes" 
of President Voronin. Evidence to this is the fact that the governmental press has not 
hesitated to label both of them as Mafia guys and corrupted bandits etc. Obviously, 
the co-operation of the main "political foes" raises concerns. Secondly, due to 
circumstances, Serafim Urechean has really become the main political opponent of 
the Communist Party and President Voronin following his victory over the communist 
candidate in the recent elections for general mayor of Chisinau. The threat that 
President Voronin made at Urechean in his recent address to the citizens have forced 
the latter to take measures of protection. The threats have manifested in the permanent 
harassment and appeals against the results of elections in courts of highest rank.  
 
Obviously, for the representatives of the ruling party and the state press it is quite 
shocking that the main opponent of the head of state goes to Tiraspol to discuss with 
the secessionist leader "socio-economic issues", while Vladimir Voronin is declared 
there persona non grata. Finally, Urechean's visit to Tiraspol has taken place 
practically at the same time with the visit to the region of the two socialist parties, 
who stated that the conflict needs to be solved on the basis of equality of the two 
subjects. This could have been a mere coincidence, but also co-operation.  
 
One of the most interesting questions refers to the advantages that the Mayor of 
Chisinau Serafim Urechean might gain from his co-operation with the secessionist 
leader Igor Smirnov. First, this co-operation may be interpreted as an elementary 
measure of protection against the harassment by the CPM. The co-operation between 
Urechean and Smirnov has taken place exactly when the CPM started to dispute the 
results of Urechean's re-election to Mayor of Chisinau. Under these circumstances, an 
eventual declaration of the results of elections null and the announcement of repeat 
elections in Chisinau could increase Urechean's rating with the most disciplined part 
of the Moldovan electorate, the Russian speaking voters. Most of the Romanian 
speaking population considers Urechean, as compared to the communist candidate, as 
the "least evil". Therefore, the ostentatious action by Urechean might be aimed at 
discouraging the CPM representatives to cancel the results of the election. It is true 
that there are other factors that should calm down the vengeful spirits of the CPM.  
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Right after the end of elections, during which the ruling party made great promises, 
things have taken an opposite turn. The price of bread has risen, as did tariffs on gas 
and electricity. But this is an immediate task.  
 
Urechean's move could be a long way shot too. In any case, one can assume that 
Moldova will be imposed the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict through 
federalisation. The right wing political forces are opposed to this scenario in any case, 
yet the guarantors (Russia and Ukraine), the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the 
European Union and the USA have all supported the resolution of the conflict through 
federalisation of Moldova. At present, Voronin's "asymmetrical federation" and 
Smirnov's "contractual" one seem to be two extremes of the federalisation process. 
Although Urechean has evasively expressed his point of view on the federalisation of 
Moldova, it is not excluded that Urechean puts forward a middle solution of a 
classical federation. For this, there's no need for a special effort. It is only necessary to 
reanimate the OSCE project, made public a year ago, which includes the main 
provisions about the constitution of a classical federation. This assumption is based on 
the fact that the media affiliated to the mayor of Chisinau has already reported that it 
would be convenient for Chisinau to become a subject of the proposed federation, and 
the governmental and state press have blamed the mayor of Chisinau of "economic 
secessionism". This sort of clashes have emerged during the recent electoral campaign 
when the mayor of Chisinau had to face attacks by the pro-Communist press which 
blamed him of the disastrous state of Chisinau. The answer of the mayor was that the 
Government leaves less than 1/3 of returns accumulated in Chisinau to cover the 
needs thereof.  
 
If things were to go in this direction it is certain that Urechean would win the 
sympathies of the citizens from the autonomous region Gagauz Yeri, whose leaders 
have long talked about the need to grant the region the status of a subject of the 
federation. For the secessionist leaders in Tiraspol, restrained by the "economic 
blockade", a compromise with Urechean to the disadvantage of the CPM would not 
seem to be too offensive.  
 
There are also great risks related to this. First, this could endanger the constitution of 
the Social Liberal Alliance made up of three parties: Alliance of Independents (AI) 
(led by Serafim Urechean), Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) and Liberal Party 
(LP), as the main political opposition formation that could provide a real alternative to 
the communist force. In any case, for the merger of AI and SDA, federalisation is not 
an obstacle. SDA has often expressed its public consent to the plan of federalisation 
of Moldova. Beyond doubt, in the LP there could emerge problems related to 
accepting federalisation in general and Urechean's contacts with Smirnov in 
particular. Without the LP, the would be united formation would gain votes from the 
Russian speakers, at the expense of the CPM, but will lose a considerable number of 
votes of Romanian speakers to the right-wing parties. In any case, the ones with 
limited possibilities seem to be the CPM. It is possible that this is the ultimate aim 
sought by Urechean and his entourage. Two years ago, the press affiliated with the ex-
president Lucinschi, currently supporting the AI and SDA wrote that in Moldova it is 
imperiously necessary to set up a democratic political force of pro-Russian orientation 
in order to avoid Russian support exclusively to the CPM, which declared itself of 
pro-Russian orientation. That things are so the statements of high Russian officials 
show with reference to the results of the recent local elections in Moldova.  
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At the first sight, the risks that Urechean has assumed are not so big. First, the most 
important right-wing parties have been vehemently criticising him already. Secondly, 
his real influence on the process of federalisation is at present an insignificant one to 
attribute him certain responsibility for the possible consequences. Therefore, 
Urechean's recent move seems to entail certain political prospects. On the other hand, 
an eventual federalisation of Moldova on the condition of giving Transdnistria the 
right to influence Moldova's foreign policy could seriously endanger the far-off 
prospects of Moldova's integration into the EU, which thing would have extremely 
negative consequences.  
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Political Parties and European Integration 
Stefan Gorda, 7 July 2003  
 
 
1. A brief historical outlook  
2. Parties' visions of the concept of normality  
3. European integration as a pragmatic objective of the parties and a model of 
development  
 
 
1. A brief historical outlook 
 
In the Republic of Moldova, the European option has first gained shape in the 
administrative structures rather than inside the political parties. For the first time the 
Moldovan authorities expressed their intention to pursue European integration in 1997 
when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a relevant letter, which was later signed 
by the President and sent to the European Commission. Following the relative victory 
of pro-European forces in the 1998 elections, the idea of European integration has 
become a dominant theme in the domestic political discourse. After the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998, the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, which held the 
majority in Parliament at the time, voted in 1998 for a decision to designate European 
integration "a major strategic objective for our country." On 1 July 1998, the EU-
Moldova Partnership and Co-operation Agreement entered into force and instituted an 
institutional basis for the EU-Moldova relations. Some members of the legislative 
body would put forward various proposals to create a specialised department or even 
ministry and take firmer action, including leave the CIS. However, the configuration 
of forces in the Parliament did not allow for those proposals to materialise. In 2000, 
following intense consultations, 25 political and social formations, notoriously with 
the exception of the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM), signed a Document-Appeal 
calling for a nation-wide consensus on the objective of European integration. In 1998-
2001, parliamentary and governmental delegations worked consistently in order to 
orient Moldova towards European integration and thus laid the foundation for a 
permanent co-operation with the EU.  
 
In the 2001 electoral campaign, the liberal, Christian democratic and social 
democratic parties tried to win votes under the flags of national rebirth, reforms and 
European integration. Still acting as an anti-system party, back then the CPM deemed 
wrong the pledge for national rebirth and modernization on the basis of capitalism and 
liberal democracy. The communists vehemently criticised the foreign policy of the 
previous governments and promised that if they won the elections they would pledge 
for Moldova joining of the Russia-Belarus Union. On 25 February 2001, the CPM 
gained the absolute majority in the new Parliament. The attempt by the CPM to 
impose non-popular decisions likely to restore the status quo of the Soviet period 
were toughly sanctioned and the Christian Democratic Party organised ample street 
manifestations for about three months. One of the favourite slogans of the 
demonstrators, who were mainly young, was "We want to go to Europe". In spring of 
2002, the Christian democrats proposed to organise a referendum on Moldova joining 
the EU and NATO, but the proposal was rejected by the authorities. The mediation of 
the Council of Europe put an end to the demonstrations. At the same time, the Social-
Democratic Alliance, a parliamentary party, the Liberal Party, not represented in  
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Parliament, and a number of other parties set up a Round Table with Permanent Status 
which was supposed to be an alternative to the communist excesses and the street 
demonstrations. The Round Table was to identify solutions to defend the democratic 
values, continue the reforms and enhance efforts at European integration. On 5 June 
2002, a series of political parties from the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
opposition, as well as a few non-governmental organisations signed an Appeal to the 
President calling upon him to set up the National Commission for European 
Integration to draft the Strategy of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, 
i.e. her joining the EU. The CPM failed to sign the Appeal, although later, in view of 
the domestic and external circumstances, its leaders, who were also in government, 
pursued a number of opposition proposals. The Statement of the participants in the 
Round Table of 2 October 2002 singled out in relation to the proposal by the 
communist President Voronin to set up a National Commission for European 
Integration that the official application for EU membership by the Moldovan 
authorities would be a first concrete action to justify the proclamation of European 
integration as the foreign policy priority of Moldova. The change in the message of 
the state leadership has been noted in Brussels too, and a statement adopted in 
October 2002 saluted "the European aspirations of the Republic of Moldova and its 
serious intentions to deepen the general relations with the EU". In November 2002, 
the President issued the Decree on founding the National Commission for European 
Integration, which was charged to draft and submit to Parliament the Strategy of 
European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, draft and approve the action plan to 
apply the said strategy and co-ordinate the application of the plan.  
 
Thus, both the political opposition and the active part of the society have succeeded in 
imposing a fundamentally important decision for the European future of our country, 
a decision which will have an irreversible nature after and if Moldova applies 
officially for membership. Although the Communist Party has not programmed 
European integration as a political priority, and despite its categorical victory in the 
2001 elections, its earlier decisions are still in force. The leadership of the Republic of 
Moldova has been stating ever more fervently that it will further pursue European 
integration. At least three hypotheses may be formulated with regard to this new 
approach of the CPM. It could be a provisional manoeuvre, one dictated by 
contingencies, an eventual considerable change in the political programme of the 
communists through an abandon of their ideology, or the prevalence of political 
pragmatism, of the Realpolitik. The opposition has regarded with scepticism and 
suspicion this new approach of the communists being aware of CPM earlier positions. 
The leaders of the opposition have doubted not only the seriousness of the rulers 
regarding this idea, but also their very ability to rule the country. Thus, the Alliance of 
Independents believes that Moldova needs - now more than ever, a pragmatic, 
credible and efficient political alternative. The Liberal Party has warned: "the political 
direction promoted by the communist leadership leaves one with ever fewer hopes 
with regard to Moldova's chances to meet the political, economic and social European 
standards".  
 
In mid 2002, we thus witnessed a stratagem of the communists who declared 
European integration the principal direction of the government and thereby assumed 
the pro-European rhetoric and passed the hostilities into the opposition's field. Since 
then, the criticism against the policy of the ruling party is always made with the  
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mention that in the issue of European integration the actions of the government seem 
to be driven by the logic of the objective tendencies on the continent.  
 
 
2. Parties' visions of the concept of normality 
 
On the issue of European integration there is to be made, nonetheless, a systemic 
distinction between the opposition and the ruling party, which resides chiefly in their 
differing visions of the concept of normality. While the majority of political parties 
have conceived the Soviet period as one of occupation and the independence and 
European integration as a reversal to normality, the CPM regards the "Soviet values" 
as beneficial ones. If one paraphrases the plastic formula of the social liberals, one can 
say that the opposition aspires towards European integration facing the future, while 
the communists adopt the European idea more facing the past. Whereas the Christian 
democratic, liberal, social liberal and social democratic parties advocate for reforms 
to abolish the communist mentality and practices, the message of the ruling party is 
intent on creating the impression that many of the "socialist achievements" could be 
applied today. The opposition parties pledge for denationalisation and privatisation 
and for decreasing the role of the state in the economic processes, while the 
communists' programme, truthfully reflected in the government activity, refers to 
moving backwards and a comeback to economic guidance and planning, increasing 
the weight and role of the state and collective sector and the Soviet administrative 
model. The democratic parties believe that the 1988-1989 National Movement "has 
liberated us from the patterns of an anachronic world and has offered us the chance to 
return to the European realm where we belong naturally". The communists interpret 
the same events as ones that have put an end to a period of prospering and, hence, 
independence is a result of previous mistakes and of the global capitalist conspiracy. 
The communists have not yet given up their "invaluable Soviet spiritual legacy", 
while the opposition is wary of the gravity of problems caused by the "mentality of 
Soviet type, which is primitive, egalitarian and docile to any sort of power." To 
conciliate these two diametrically opposed visions is almost impossible, and yet the 
task of European integration requires consensus on recent history.  
 
 
3. European integration as a pragmatic objective of the parties and a model of 
development 
 
The programmes of various Moldovan political parties include more or less coherent 
references to the re-dimensioning of the external actions of our state around the 
objective of European integration. To make the retrospection easier, we will take an 
overview of Moldovan parties, from right to left, which is not intended as a 
classification thereof by their degree of Europeanness.  
 
People's Christian Democratic Party believes that the Republic of Moldova needs 
to adopt a firm and irreversible position with regard to integration into the EU and 
NATO. The prospect of joining the EU is to become the sole realistic and viable 
strategy of development of the state, which can succeed only if it gathers a wide 
national consensus and is conscientiously and honestly shared by the power, the 
opposition and the entire society. The Christian democrats stress that "joining in the 
foreseeable future the EU if for us a major strategic objective. The European  
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orientation involves legislative and structural reforms, the normal functioning of 
democratic institutions, the respect for human rights, the exercise of government 
according to European practices and the fulfilment of all recommendations and 
requirements of the Council of Europe and the EU".  
 
Liberal Party opts for the priority of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, 
through a maximal match of the political, economic and security structures of Europe. 
The political priority of Moldova is integration into the European Union. For this 
purpose, the following must be achieved: "modernisation, based on the west European 
values, of the society and the state, taking into account, at the same time, the specific 
conditions and traditions of our people". The conclusion of our state building efforts 
involves setting up a national entity favourable to modernisation and European 
integration, which would ensure the strict obeisance of laws by all citizens and by all 
state and public institutions. The Liberal Party has announced that it will draft and 
later apply a series of wide-ranging economic, social and cultural programmes to 
align the Republic of Moldova to the European standards on a relatively short term.  
 
Alliance of Independents speaks of "adjusting the Moldovan peculiarities to the EU 
requirements". The party pleads for more efforts at the gradual integration of Moldova 
into the EU. "The lack of a strategic plan of European integration is Moldova's biggest 
weakness". No government has ever had such a plan and that is why the reforms have 
not been properly concluded.  
 
Social-Democratic Alliance reminds that Moldova's integration into the European 
structures needs "adjusting all standards - political, economic, human rights and 
freedoms". This is the way towards edifying a socially oriented market economy, 
founded on the principles of modernisation and development and able to capitalise on 
all resources and capabilities of the Moldovan society, so that our people can take its 
well deserved place in the family of European civilisation, the Alliance's programme 
reads.  
 
Social-Liberal Party believes that by reactivating the economic potential and self-
determination, Moldova can go for a change that would gradually bridge the gap with 
the rest of Europe in order to catch the 'train' of European integration. The place of 
Moldova in the new European geopolitical landscape, still in the process of 
configuration, will be decided upon by the results of our own development efforts, the 
performance of our economic agents and the capacity to manage our resources 
efficiently. The party reminds that the individual effort is the fundamental source of 
improvement, in the context of ample economic and cultural integration in the 
contemporary world. As for the European integration, the role of the state is essential. 
The state has the duty to prepare the national economy for compatibility with the EU 
norms, and apply such active commercial, industrial and agricultural policies as to 
make the Moldovan production export oriented and attract foreign investments. The 
state should support through balanced protection the becoming and enhancement of 
the local capital, in accordance with the commercial agreements signed with our 
foreign partners. Special attention should be paid to programmes seeking to foster the 
competitiveness of our national economy.  
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Social-Democratic Party stresses that Moldova's joining of the EU is totally 
consonant with the basic parameters of the societal model adopted by the party. Thus, 
the social democrats demand speeding up the drafting of the National Strategy of 
joining the EU. Obviously, Moldova does have certain economic and intellectual 
potential that could contribute efficiently to the edification of a stable and prosperous 
Europe once integrated.  
 
Democratic Party mentions the issue of European integration only indirectly by 
proposing to "implement the European democratic values".  
 
Communist Party approaches the subject of European integration and refers to the 
need "to integrate into the CIS and the European space", and believes that to get 
closer to the EU it is enough to adjust the CIS standards to those of the EU. The ruling 
party does not have a European model of development for the Republic of Moldova 
and recommends, in its programme, to undergo two stages in order to overcome the 
current crisis. In the first stage the communists will go for "removing the 
consequences of reforms, stopping the illicit privatisation of collective property, 
reanimating the economic, technical and scientific potential of the country and going 
back to the former model of social relations". In the next stage of reviving socialism, 
the party intends to ensure the "direct participation of the working class in the 
leadership of the state. A passage to the socialist organisation of the economy aimed 
at meeting the needs of the social class will be achieved". The communists' policy 
seeks to "build socialism with the ultimate end of building communism". It is worth 
looking in more detail at the position of communists, since they are the ruling party, 
and their conversion to the European idea is a singular experience of its sort. The 
programme of the CPM clearly indicates what its attitude to economic integration is, 
and specifies: "despite the reform of the capitalism, its essence remains the same - to 
explore cheap labour forces." This, the communist programme writes, "leads to 
heterogeneous development and the exploration of some countries by others". The 
communists believe that "an argument in this sense is the tendency of western states 
to subdue the Moldovan economy, impose itself in our market and enter into the 
possession of our property, press unfair contracts on us, grant us credits under 
suffocating terms and accentuate our state's dependency on foreign creditors." In 
March 2003, the CPM newspaper Comunistul published a methodical indication in 
which the secretary of the central committee of the CPM and chairman of the 
parliamentary standing committee for foreign policy admitted that the idea of raising 
Moldova's foreign debt while getting it deeper into the integration process is very 
popular among the party inner circles. The party members were reported to delve on 
what would be more convenient: to retain membership of various European 
organisations or carry out social programmes. The analysis of the CPM programme 
and publications begs the conclusion that the issue of regional integration is often 
regarded in the context of social antagonisms of Marxist type, and the objective trend 
towards regional integration is judged in pronounced anti-globalisation terms.  
 
In its dialogue with the outside world, the communist leaders avoid to attack overtly 
the system set up during the years of independence and declare themselves advocates 
of democratic values, the market economy and the open society. However, the 
opposition parties believe that through the policy promoted by the government and the 
institutions controlled by the CPM, the system of pluralist democracy, market 
economy and foreign investments in the real sector of the economy, which is a key  
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element of the European integration policy, are being undermined from within. The 
Liberal Party declared that the process of nationalisation, promoted by the rulers 
against the principles of the market economy, started by liquidating the "Eurofarm" 
Group and, later, "Drezdenbank" - the partner of "Air Moldova", as well as 
"Sudzuker", "Lafarge" and other western companies. The intimidation of the largest 
yet foreign investor in Moldova, the Spanish "Union Fenosa", manifested in the 
"rulings of a corrupt judiciary, totally controlled by the government, creates an 
extremely unfavourable image for our state and compromises our chances of getting 
connected to the European political and economic processes".  
 
The successive governments that come to power without clear projects, learn from 
experience and often implement their opponents' programmes create incertitude and 
weaken the social basis for European integration. Our current government is no 
exception to this rule, and it has needed two years to understand that there is no 
alternative to Moldova's European integration. The political parties have different 
visions on the strategic objective of European integration, especially on the place and 
role of the state in this process, the concrete ways of reforming and adjusting the 
Moldovan economy and society to the community standards, the structure of economy 
and property, the role of foreign investment, the administrative model, the role of the 
civil society etc. From the point of view of a concrete and responsible approach to the 
complexity of their tasks, our political parties are still immature and unprepared. Their 
predilection for macro modelling and schematics may be fatal for the mobilisation of 
all social strata and of the entire society towards achieving the objective of European 
integration. Those political parties that pretend to have coherent projects have yet to 
get over the stage of general declarations of sharing and joining in the efforts at 
European integration and plan the existential trajectory of the 4.5 million people for 
the next 10-15 years, i.e. encapsulate 4.5 million mini-projects into their global 
project of European integration. The people's approval of the idea of European 
integration is directly proportional with the interest that each of the 4.5 million might 
take in the mini-project developed by his/her party. Otherwise, parties risk getting as 
much support for European integration as they did for building communism. If people 
will not see their interests reflected in the projects of European integration, there is 
little hope that the development and modernisation of Moldova will enjoy the 
individual input of its every citizen and the sum of all energies nationwide.  
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Political parties between the EU and the CIS 
Stefan Gorda, 14 July 2003  
 
 
A defining element for understanding the position of parties on the issue of European 
integration is the way they conceive the geopolitical orientation of our state. This is 
even more salient as high European officials have been indicating more overtly that as 
Moldova gets closer to the European structures, it will have to decide whether it wants 
to join the EU or the CIS.  
 
People's Christian Democratic Party regards the time factor as a very pressing one. 
To find a right place in the future European architecture, the state has to undertake an 
energetic European offensive to persuade its European partners of the seriousness of 
Moldova's European commitments. Our membership of the Community of 
Independent States (CIS), as well as the intention of our current government to 
integrate Moldova into the Russia-Belarus Union are insurmountable barriers in the 
way of our joining the EU. Our chances to join the EU depend, decisively, on our 
capacity to align with a group of countries in the South East European region. 
Association to this group of states involves abandoning the group of states in which 
Moldova is currently included, together with Belarus and Ukraine, these two states 
being dominated by serious problems that should not affect our country's pace of 
European integration. Surprisingly, these proposals of the Christian democrats are 
explicit in the positions of our current government. Yet, unlike the authorities, the 
PCDP, along with the Liberal Party, remind that the current geopolitical context and 
our strategic interests oblige Moldova to take into account the existent 
complementarity between the EU and NATO. It is necessary for the state to become 
aware of the logic underpinning the eastern enlargement of the two organisations. 
Moldova needs to go the same way that the countries of Central and South Eastern 
Europe have gone, for which joining NATO was initially a determinant factor in their 
later efforts at joining the EU. To accomplish this objective, Moldova will have to 
give up its permanent neutrality status, which is "an out of date and inefficient 
principle of defending national security. The NATO military dimension should not be 
a pretext for Moldova's withdrawal from its Euro-Atlantic integration".  
 
Liberal Party believes that Moldova is an integral part of the European cultural space 
and the main effort in safeguarding a natural place in the European architecture is 
integration - unequivocal - in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.  
 
The Social Democratic Alliance of Moldova is a proponent of integration into the 
European structures and at the same time opts for maintaining traditional relations 
between Moldova and the countries to its East. European Integration in no way 
contravenes or rule out the continuation and enhancement of relations between 
Moldova and the CIS states. Contacts and relations with the Euro-Atlantic structures, 
first of all NATO, are to be oriented "towards consolidating stability and global peace, 
with the necessary respect for the country's neutrality".  
 
Believing that joining the EU is for Moldova a strategic objective, the Social 
Democratic Party "in no way approves of moving our relations with the CIS partners 
in the background". They are "firmly convinced that the inefficiency of this 
community in relation to the initial expectations is largely due to the passivity of the 
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governments in the member states, the lack of initiative and insistence in promoting 
mutually advantageous co-operation. This is also true of the Moldovan authorities 
who have failed to apply a strategy of developing economic and political co-operation 
in the CIS, that would have brought outstanding results to our country".  
 
Movement "Ravnopravie" (Equality of rights) will strive for enhancing and 
expanding economic and cultural relations with the CIS member states and first of all 
with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.  
 
Party of Communists of Moldova will "safeguard Moldova's active participation in 
the integration processes in the CIS and European areas and within the international 
economic structures."  
 
One can thus mention an extremely wide range of geopolitical options of our parties. 
The liberals and Christian democrats have spoken of the need to reconsider the 
membership of our country in the CIS, and the European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration are presented as the two alternatives to our CIS membership. The social 
democrats in the Parliament (SDAM) and those outside it (SDPM), do not see any 
contradiction in terms between our membership of the CIS and the EU. They remain 
extremely concerned with the neutrality of Moldova and in their programmes they 
pledge for joining NATO, although lately their visions has evolved substantially, and 
they have been talking of the need for closer co-operation with the North Atlantic 
Alliance. More to the left, the Democratic Party and the CPM do not even consider 
talking about an eventual joining of NATO but rather of a natural complementarity 
between the European Union and the CIS, while the "Ravnopravie" (Equality of 
rights) Movement simply ignores the united Europe.  
 
 
II. Political management: between desiderata and feasible project 
 
It seems that the communist leaders at the rule of the state are tempted to adopt a 
pragmatic behaviour, understanding that at present Moldova has no viable alternative 
to European integration. The ruling party has two wings: one busy with the 
administration of the state and the other - with disputing the decisions of the former. 
The division between the two is nuanced, it is more visible sometimes, at other times 
the same people pass easily from the administrative action, more or less responsible, 
to the rhetoric of dispute. This double doctrine and behaviour explain the virulent 
discourse of the current government. It is not by chance that the turn towards the 
European rhetoric is presented as premiere at national scale. The leaders of the anti-
system party, integrally in opposition before the February 2001 elections, under 
pressure from the internal and regional configuration, have changed direction and 
have denied everything that was done before then on the issue of European integration. 
Declaring their commitment to the European option, the leaders of the CPM have 
been demolishing the institutions of the state, such as the local autonomy and the 
institution of prefect, tailored by the model and with the support of Europe. It is true 
that the more realistic wing in the party gains more ground, yet the communist leaders 
who follow the communist practices make use of the language of dispute, while the 
society has started to get used to this double message. The fact that the party of 
communists overall has not changed its line and has not made public its position on 
the issue of European integration is due to the hidden power and weight of the  
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opposing wing, as well as to the traditional obedience of the communists towards the 
old metropolis. The chair of the CPM, who is also president of the country, has never 
raised frankly before his party colleagues the need for re-orienting the programme of 
the party, probably in order to avoid the risk of damaging his image in the party 
circles but of breaking the unity of the party. As a result, the administration promotes 
an alternative policy, declared pro-European, which to a certain extent takes into 
account the domestic realities and in particular the rapport of forces on the continent, 
but which presupposes a visible autarchic touch, one of relying on local resources and 
the structures inherited from the Soviet period. Clearly, the 2002 initiative when the 
Head of State pushed for European integration, was a manifestation of the prevalence 
of the more realistic wing. Due to pressure from opposition parties and the society on 
the whole, the favourable international conditions and, apparently, their analysis, the 
spontaneous support by the communists of European integration will gain more 
ground. For the time being, we are witnessing an obvious paradox. While European 
integration becomes a real national idea for Moldova, enjoying the overwhelming 
support of the population, as has shown in all polls conducted recently, this idea 
seems to irremediably divide the ruling party. It could lead even to a split in the CPM, 
especially if the issue of European integration passes from declarations to practical 
politics, and especially if the leadership of the state faces the sacramental dilemma of 
the communists - either the EU or the CIS. The quicker Moldova advances on the way 
to European integration, the more the internal conflict in the CPM will aggravate and 
closer the day of final dispute between the moderate and the tougher wings will be. In 
the short term, this internal dispute will have a certain impact on managing the 
process of European integration, as apart from important state tasks, the current 
leadership will have to face a powerful current from inside the party, which will 
dispute the legitimacy of the European option.  
 
The stake that the ruling party has put on denying the impact that the opposition 
parties had and might have is counter-productive to the process of European 
integration. Permanently facing the pro-European parties, and neglecting the 
initiatives of the opposition, marring their significance and maintaining in the centre 
of public debates many of the themes of the past, the communists have weakened the 
cohesion of the society in view of achieving the objective of European integration. By 
limiting the access of other parties to the state media with national coverage the ruling 
party has narrowed the social basis for the process of European integration. On the 
other hand, the chronic weakness of the opposition has reduced substantially the 
chances that its pro-European proposals be heard, understood and supported by the 
society. Other parties have newspapers with limited circulation and this has seriously 
undermined the media effect of their pro-European line. The opposition parties, with 
few exceptions, do not have special departments working on programmes and projects 
of European integration, and the issue is dealt with by their foreign policy experts or 
spokespersons. The parties' strategies of communication with the society, intended to 
generalise and permanentise the European option, are most often incoherent and 
improperly articulated. The level of preparation for the process of European 
integration must be measured by the agenda of debates and reflections proposed by 
the political parties on the issue of European integration. We would like to mention 
here the initiative of the Christian democrats to hold a referendum on the issue of 
joining the EU and NATO, the initiative of the Liberal Party to set up the Round 
Table with Permanent Status, the proposal by the participants to the Round Table, 
addressed to President Voronin, to set up a National Commission for drafting a new  
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strategy of European integration, the conferences organised by the Social-Liberal 
Party, the actions of the Alliance of Independents aimed at promoting democracy and 
local autonomy, the fostering of relations between the Moldovan political parties with 
European political parties.  
 
The opposition parties are for the time being few, many competent specialists avoid 
joining their ranks, and those already in participate in groups holding rivalling 
interests. Thus, parties lack the necessary intellectual input for articulating a profound 
and detailed message. The need for every important party to work out an operational 
model of European integration is dictated by the imperative of good governance. The 
Liberal Party, for example, believes that we need "a new political thinking and 
practice, according to which safeguarding general well being may not be through of 
without the well being of every citizen". The model of society for which the 
democratic parties plead involves a series of policies and actions which have not been 
finalised to date. The opposition parties are fragmented, organisationally weak and 
lack the financial means to wage an intensive media offensive. As a result, they focus 
their efforts primarily in the sphere of immediate politics and of improving their 
current image in order to increase their electoral chances and are less concerned about 
developing concrete programmes and viable alternatives. They do not have political, 
economic and ideological programmes that would be complex, detailed and 
rigorously drafted for the neighbourhood with the EU, the pre-accession period, the 
negotiation stages and the accession to the EU.  
 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
1. Ensuing from the above is a need for an analysis of the compatibility of Moldovan 
parties and in particular of the ruling one with the political parties from the EU 
Member States. All political parties need to consider the following priority tasks: 
constitution of an European identity, drafting complex policies of European 
integration and of communicating with the society.  
 
2. While the CPM lacks its own vision of the European option, it is now applying the 
visions of the opposition parties. Its leaders promote the European integration without 
having their own project, structured and coherent, and without an internal party 
consensus. The lack of CPM's own political project does not mobilise the ruling party 
and the society around the objective of European integration, despite the fact that the 
party further enjoys the support of the electorate. The irreversibility of European 
option of the communists remains open, as long as the current programme of the party 
is valid.  
 
3. One can note an obvious gap between the programme provisions and the practical 
actions of parties, among their programmes, often old and anachronistic, and the pro-
European declarations of the leaders of parties. To synchronise their message and 
actions, some parties will have to adjust their programmes to the new circumstances.  
 
4. The right wing, centre-right and centre-left parties are aware of the importance of 
the objective of European integration for the future of our country and have proposed 
the measures that they think need to be taken. However, their political programmes 
are generally declarative and demand driven, they picture the European future too  
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abstractly, as a common good for the country, and the benefit/cost aspect is not 
presented enough. The fragility of the conceptual construction might create illusion 
among the population as to the complexity of the objective of European integration.  
 
5. The political environment in Moldova remains divided over the European option, 
some parties opt for joining NATO and the EU and others for just the EU while a 
third group believes that Moldova could be a member both of the CIS and the EU. 
Other divisions among parties arise in relation to their position on our historical 
legacy and the civilisational path that we are to follow, the policy on private property, 
the foreign investments, the role of the state, the economic, social and cultural policies 
and other important problems. The systemic differences in approach have a negative 
impact on our national cohesion on our strategic objectives.  
 
6. Under these circumstances, the political parties are to identify an acceptable 
method of reconciliation of interests, to agree on a minimum package of coherent 
policies in important fields and a national plan of actions, with a view to build wide 
national consensus which will help prepare the effective accession of the Republic of 
Moldova to the European Union.  
 16
Endless elections? 
17 July 2003  
 
 
More than one month has passed since the date of the general local elections, but it 
seems that they will never end. The runoff repeat voting for the election of mayors 
was held on 22 June and 6 July, but the wave of complaints against the results of the 
elections is growing further. For example, the results of the elections are still being 
disputed in three localities in the Gagauz region and in several localities in the 
districts Soroca and Ungheni. It has already become a phenomenon the fact that most 
often the courts rule in favour of the ruling party. The few complaints that have been 
made against irregularities committed by the ruling party have been rejected by the 
Moldovan justice. The third phenomenon is that the CP looses practically all elections 
as a result of repeat voting with almost a double difference as compared to the 
disputed results.  
 
As a rule, the CP disputes the election results by invoking the irregularities that the 
OSCE Mission has been regularly detecting in Moldova starting 1994 and which the 
OSCE has deemed unable to have a significant impact on the final election results. 
These refer to the faulty compilation of voter rolls, the "family vote" that breaches the 
secrecy of the vote, and other minor offences of the kind.  
 
It has been noted that the CP wins the cases in courts of appeal, after the courts 
responsible for the validation of mandates have ruled to the contrary. It happens 
though that the rulings of the courts of appeal in favour of the CP are denied by the 
voters, who, surprisingly, turn out in much larger numbers for the repeat voting and so 
double the difference in the number of votes received by the communist candidates 
and their opponents, with the former being the losers. There are two explanations for 
this phenomenon. First, the citizens protest against the invalidation of their votes and 
the harassment that those who win over the communists with a significant number of 
dozens or hundreds of votes are being subject to. Secondly, a month after the end of 
the electoral campaign, it has become clear for many voters that the promises of the 
government have been false as important increases in the price of energy and food 
stuff has occurred immediately after the elections instead of the promised 
improvement in the quality of life. Thus, within the repeat voting of 6 July, the 
communist candidates were defeated repeatedly in Costesti (Ialoveni district), 
Pohornicesti (Orhei district) and Cuhurestii de Jos (Floresti district).  
 
Much sadder are things in the few cases when the results of the elections are being 
disputed by the opponents of the communists. In these cases, as a rule, the court of 
first instance pleads in favour of the opponents of communists but the latter later win 
in the court of appeals. This happened in the commune Rudi in Soroca district and 
commune Magurele in Ungheni district. The last case deserves special attention as it 
brings out the new practices in Moldova. The thing is that in Magurele the difference 
between the number of votes won by the winning communist candidate and his rival 
candidate was of three votes. The court of first instance ruled in favour of the non-
communist plaintiff who had presented a number of evidence of serious violation of 
the electoral laws. First, the electoral officers in Magurele allowed four citizens, 
residents of another locality, to vote. Secondly, the polling station closed 10 minutes 
before the time provided for by the legislation, and four citizens were prevented from  
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exercising their voting rights. Thirdly, three elderly voters were deprived of the right 
to vote at home, despite their specific request to the members of the electoral bureau. 
Fourthly, it has been determined that by fault of the members of the electoral bureau 
who left their work place for a certain amount of time, the ballot of one voter was 
invalidated because it did not bear the control stamp. The same electoral officers let 
the son of the communist candidate to vote although he is not 18 yet. Obviously, with 
a difference of only three votes between the votes received by the two candidates, 
each of the four violations mentioned above could have influenced the results of the 
vote. Moreover, things got even worse as there were suspicions that the violations 
could have even be intended since two of the members of the electoral bureau are 
related to the winning communist candidate. Therefore, it was only natural for the 
court of first instance to rule in favour of the plaintiff. The fact that the court of appeal 
in Balti ruled out the ruling of the court of first instance provokes bewilderment and 
suspicion. All the more so if one compares the reasons for which the communist 
plaintiffs win when they complain with the ones mentioned in the Magurele case. The 
public opinion can only question the way in which the principle of uniform 
application of laws is being applied in Moldova and whether this is not by any chance 
what the communist government tried to achieve by reforming the judicial system. 
Also, another question might arise: what will happen to the electoral process in 
Moldova after the mandate of the current Central Electoral Commission expires and it 
is replaced by a new one, appointed by the current ruling party?  
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Changes on the Political Scene (Part I) 
30 July 2003  
 
 
On 19 July 2003, the Founding Congress of a new political party - the Alliance 
Moldova Noastra (Our Moldova) (AMN) took place. The event can be regarded as a 
highly salient one. The new party is made up of three parties, of comparable weight: 
the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), the Alliance of Independents (AI) and the 
Liberal Party (LP). These were later joined by the low profile People's Democratic 
Party (PDP). For reasons of convenience of registration with the Justice Ministry and 
political succession, the AMN has been declared the political successor of the SDA. 
As a result of the merger, at present there are 22 registered political parties in 
Moldova.  
 
 
1. Essential characteristics of the AMN  
 
The founding parties of the AMN have been part of the Electoral Bloc Social Liberal 
Alliance Moldova Noastra (Our Moldova), that was created on the eve of the 25 May 
2003 local elections. The bloc performed fairly well in the recent elections and 
received about 20% of the votes, which made it the most important opposition force. 
The leaders of the party claim to have 100,000 members, which is 5 to 6 times as 
much as the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM) and the People's Christian 
Democratic Party (PCDP), until recently considered the main opposition force in 
Moldova.  
 
AMN proclaimed itself a "party of citizens" and has pledged for the harmonisation of 
inter-ethnic relations in Moldova. In addition, the AMN has claimed it will promote 
social policies and "represent the interests of the middle class in formation". This 
latter option draws upon the social-liberal doctrine to which the AMN has adhered, 
willing to "combine the principle of individual freedom with that of social solidarity, 
the minimal role of the state and its responsibility for the unconditioned and equal 
respect for the law". The major political issue currently faced by Moldova, the 
Transdnistrian conflict, the AMN intends to resolve through the internationalisation of 
the conflict resolution efforts. In the foreign policy field, the AMN agenda is topped 
by the European integration of Moldova. This task, in the view of AMN, may be 
accomplished "through the declared and clearly demonstrated support of Romania, 
with whom, in the context of the European community, we will share a common 
European historic, economic, cultural and language space".  
 
 
2. Factors that have determined the foundation of the AMN  
 
There is a series of factors that have determined the founding of the AMN. First, the 
main constituent parties and its leaders have been in an overt conflict with the 
authorities and the ruling party. None of these parties had the capacity to cope with 
that conflict on its own. Secondly, the merge is a logical follow up of the events that 
started with the foundation of the Democratic Forum of Moldova in May 2001 
following the CPM absolute victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections. These were 
succeeded by a number of important mergers that reduced the number of registered  
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parties from 31 to 25. Hence, the foundation of AMN was to be expected after the 
relative success that it registered in the May 2003 elections.  
 
This has made the new party rather attractive both for the potential new members and 
for the voters who are looking for a strong reform-driven party to invest their hopes. 
Likewise, the foundation of the AMN could attract potential sponsors from the 
business environment who have become disillusioned with the current government's 
economic policies. Secondly, the AMN name and symbols seem to have been 
properly chosen and, most importantly, they are already familiar to the voters. 
Interestingly, in the neighbouring countries, the most important opposition formations 
or those affiliated with the government bear in their names the name of the country, 
which seems to be popular with the voters, as for example "Íàøà Óêðàèíà" (Our 
Ukraine), "Åäèíàÿ Ðîññèÿ" (United Russia). Thirdly, the AMN has been created after 
the potential of the Moldovan political forces has been clearly elucidated. It has thus 
become clear that in the upcoming parliamentary campaign, which is to start in one 
year and a half, about four political forces will be able to compete seriously. These 
are, in the conventional left-right order, the CPM, the Democratic Party of Moldova 
(DPM), the AMN and the PCDP. Another serious competitor in those elections could 
be the recent electoral bloc between the Social Democratic Party and the Social 
Liberal Party. The remaining 15 registered parties will be non-significant allies of 
these strong contestants or they will merely harness votes for the parties that will pass 
the 6% threshold.  
 
From this perspective, the positioning of the AMN, the most powerful opposition 
force, at the centre of the political spectrum increases its chances to participate in the 
future coalition government, be it centre-left or centre-right. That such positioning is 
advantageous has been proved by the Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous 
Moldova in the aftermath of the 1998 parliamentary elections. Back then, the 
Movement held the key position in the talks on setting up the parliamentary majority 
with the right-wing parties, on the one hand, and the CPM, on the other hand. 
Notably, the current electoral weight of the AMN is almost similar to the one held by 
the Movement in 1998.  
 
Another important factor for the future electoral projects of the AMN is that the rating 
of the current ruling party has stepped into a phase of decline. This has clearly shown 
in the recent local elections. Despite the official reports of "impetuous economic 
growth", independent experts have insisted on an eventual cumulating effect of the 
negative factors in the economy of the country, such as the increase in prices on 
energy and foodstuffs. All these factors have exacerbated the frustration of the entire 
local and central state administration caused by endless reforms, revisions of previous 
reforms, new conceptions and strategies in the domestic and foreign policy, of which 
none can possibly be carried out fully. Importantly, these assumptions have been 
confirmed by the former presidential adviser Victor Doras, who contributed greatly to 
the CPM victory in 2001 and who knows in minute detail the state of the art in 
various fields of major importance for the development of the country. Thus, the 
prospect of the CPM rating shrinking to levels attested elsewhere in the CIS area (20 
to 30 percent in Russia and Ukraine) is the most probable. Differently put, on the eve 
of the 2005 parliamentary elections, the CPM rating might be equal to that of the 
AMN. Of course, this sort of estimations is very approximate. Nonetheless, it was the 
CPM leader himself, Vladimir Voronin, who said immediately after the CPM victory 
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 in 2001 that he was aware of the fact that an important share of the electorate had 
supported the CPM largely out of a feeling of protest against the previous 
governments. It is the current government itself that might become the main object of 
discontent of the protesting voters in future elections. One can thus assume that most 
of the discontent ones will opt for the parties at the centre of the political spectrum, 
the DPM and the AMN. Surely, after the ceremonial "putting into practice the vertical 
axis of power" during the last CPM plenary meeting, one can expect it to become the 
principal resource that the CPM will use to cling to power.  
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European Integration - A Strategic Objective? 
7 August 2003  
 
 
On 31 July 2003, The Parliament held the closing meeting of the 2003 spring-summer 
session, which heard reports by President Voronin, Prime Minister Tarlev and 
Speaker Ostapciuc. The speech of President Voronin was called by the official press 
as a programmatic one that fixed new benchmarks for the fulfilment of Moldova's 
major objective - integration into the European Union. The official press also 
expressed bewilderment at the fact that the proposals that the president made in his 
speech have not been debated or commented upon. Indeed, the speech of the president 
and his proposals are of positive significance and deserve special attention. Thus, 
Voronin determined the intermediary task for Moldova to become EU associate by 
2007. Achieving this task requires an understanding between all Moldova's political 
forces and coherence of action.  
 
However, due to the permanent conflict with the majority faction, both opposition 
factions, that of the People's Christian Democratic Party and that of the Social 
Democratic Alliance, boycotted the closing meeting of the Parliament to which the 
president delivered his speech. Anyway, this fact cannot underestimate an eventual 
co-operation between the ruling party and the opposition towards achieving the 
objective set by the president, because in both opposition factions' political 
programmes European integration features as Moldova's strategic objective. On the 
other hand, the absence of the opposition factions from the parliament room was a 
symbolic one if one observes that the last plenary meeting of the parliament was not 
different from a gathering of the ruling party. It is this very fact that makes things 
especially significant.  
 
The thing is that one month ago, during the last plenary meeting of the ruling party, 
Vladimir Voronin, in his capacity of Chair of the Communist Party, addressed 
literally the same audience. In his speech back then, Voronin said that "the 
parliamentary activity is just another, subordinated part of the overall activity of the 
party. This is the way things should be. This is the right way. If this rule is breached, 
the chaos and lack of responsibility will be inevitable, lading to apolitism and self-
destruction".  
 
This statement by President Voronin should be a very confusing one for the members 
of the ruling Communist Party who are also members of parliament. The appeal of the 
Head of State Voronin to take efforts to integrate Moldova into the EU are in flagrant 
contradiction with the appeal of the Chair of the Communist Party Voronin. The thing 
is that the political manifesto of the party, adopted in April 2001, soon after the 
communists' absolute victory in the 2001 elections, clearly provides for Moldova's 
integration into the Russia-Belarus Union and the foundation of a federation of the 
former Soviet republics.  
 
Moreover, in his last speech to the Parliament, President Voronin stressed that "if we 
think of ourselves as politicians, if we are ready to be accountable to our people for 
every word we say, then, I believe it is time to proceed to concrete actions". We 
would like to remind that as chairman of the party, at the plenary meeting of the party 
in May last year, which, as we have seen, was to subordinate the parliamentary  
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activity of the majority faction, Voronin stated that it would be necessary to change 
the manifesto and modernise the party. To date, none of this has been done.  
 
Nonetheless, President Voronin proposed in his last speech new changes, which he 
called revolutionary and intended to modernise Moldova. In this sense, he asked 
himself and his party colleagues weather there was an alternative to Moldova's 
integration into the EU: "Now that the global processes of integration have 
transcended the borders of the European Union, can our country stay hostage to some 
indigenous particularisms, can we claim a historic path different from the one that all 
modern states pursue? Let us not make illusions! There is no alternative!". Here it is 
worth remembering that the sole peculiarity of Moldova is that the party that rules it 
had the ambition, two years ago, to include in its political programme the strategic 
objective of building communism. Moreover, during the party congress that approved 
the said programme, one insisted on the conviction that Moldova would become the 
epicentre of the rebirth of the international communist movement. Now that we know 
that there is no alternative to integration into the EU, and the party decisions have 
priority and must be applied by the institutions of the state, then, to make actions 
coherent, it would be logical to change the programme of the party so that it, just like 
the programmes of the opposition parties, provides expressly for the strategic 
objective of European integration. When such a change is made, appeals such as the 
one to co-operation between the ruling party and the opposition will be much more 
credible.  
 
If one tries to assess the degree to which actions match words, as the president has 
urged us to, then we would notice that at the recent plenary meeting of the ruling 
party, in a solemn atmosphere, the doctrine of "vertical axis of power" has been 
launched. One knows that authoritarian regimes tend to embrace this sort of doctrine. 
None of the EU Member States or future EU members is concerned with enforcing 
this doctrine. How, then, can the ruling party inspire credibility when it calls for 
implementing the EU democratic standards if the consequences of the "vertical axis of 
power" doctrine are the undermining of the independence of the judicial system and 
of the integrity of the electoral process, as has been shown in the OSCE Election 
Observation reports? Similarly, how can the Communist Party be credible if still 
disputes the victory of its ally from the Centre Left Union, the Party of Socialists, in 
the mayor elections in two Gagauz localities?  
 
Speaking of the remarkable economic and social achievements, which should bring us 
closer to the EU, the representatives of the ruling party do avoid to explain why, for 
the third consecutive year, Moldova's indicator of human development is shrinking, 
bringing us further apart from the EU. The reason may be that while speaking of the 
need to implement the economic standards of the EU, the ruling party continues to 
harass foreign investors and undermine the autonomous activity of agencies that 
regulate the energy price policy. It is well known that all this has a negative impact on 
our relations with the international financial bodies as well as the EU donor states. 
But, at a closer look, one notes that things are the way they are because the political 
programme of the Communist Party says so, and, as the last plenary meeting of the 
party has shown, it has priority.  
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Thus, it is obvious that before proposing to the society new objectives the leaders of 
the ruling party should understand one simple thing - they should bring their own 
political programme in line with the objectives set forth by the president in his last 
speech.  
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Transdnistrian project 
12 August 2003  
 
 
1. Sources of inspiration  
 
On August 6, Transdnistrian leaders made public their own draft Constitution for the 
prospective federation. In fact, it has nothing to do with establishing a federation, but 
rather with establishing a union of independent states, i.e. confederation, or as they 
put it "contractual federation". What is annoying is the fact that the subjects' right to 
secession is tackled right at the beginning of the document under the transitory 
provisions.  
 
As for the content, at least two sources of inspiration are traceable, namely Treaty on 
the establishment of the Russia-Belarus common state and Constitutional Charter of 
the Serbia and Montenegro Union States. At least a couple of premises for the 
establishment of Serbia - Montenegro and Russia - Belarus common states could be 
identified, which derive directly from those countries' interests. For instance, the goal 
of Serbia and Montenegro is to join EU in a common effort, fact reflected in Article 3 
of the Constitutional Charter. To be accepted in EU those two countries have to 
conform to the requirement of preserving the union state. As for Russia-Belarus, 
under Article 6 of the Treaty the union subjects are to remain full rights UN members. 
The Union is established merely for economic reasons. Therefore, a would-be 
separation of subjects in the case of Serbia and Montenegro is tackled in one of the 
last chapters, whereas in the case of Russia - Belarus it is not tackled at all. Needless 
to say, de facto the said Union does not exist, although the Treaty was signed four 
years ago.  
 
Given this it would be interesting to reflect a little on the reasons for establishing a 
union between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, from the standpoint of the 
breakaway region. On the one hand, Transdnistrian region has no status whatsoever. 
On the other, it is also true that by signing the Memorandum in 1997 Moldova agreed 
in principle on establishing a joint state formed by two equal rights subjects. The 
Memorandum entitles Transdnistria to have a saying in the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Moldova in as far as its interests are concerned. From this perspective the 
mere fact that Republic of Moldova set EU integration as one of its strategic goals, 
whereas Transdnistria declares itself a "Russian land", already poses a threat for the 
existence of the would-be "joint state". Nevertheless, the guarantor countries Russia, 
Ukraine and OSCE signed the Memorandum. Furthermore, Republic of Moldova and 
Russia signed the Basic Treaty providing that Republic of Moldova adhere to 
"peaceful resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict, whereas Russia will serve as a 
mediator and guarantor". Considering that Russia is Moldova's main creditor and 
trading partner, the latter attaches great importance to the official documents signed 
between the two countries. As a mater of fact, Vladimir Putin stated during his 
meeting in February with Vladimir Voronin that he would plead for "granting 
Transdnistrian region a clearly guaranteed status".  
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2. Goals pursued  
 
This being said, the question is how far may the Transdnistrian leaders want to go 
within the framework of the agreements signed by the Republic of Moldova and 
principle guarantor country. Firstly, as it was already mentioned breakaway leaders 
pursue the idea of secession of the two equal subjects - "right to secession is granted 
to any subject whenever one of the subjects makes public its intent or takes actions in 
view of renouncing to sovereignty and independence". In other words, if 
Transdnistrian leaders who are citizens of Russia declared as they used to, that 
Transdnistria is a "Russian land", then they would be entitled to legally hold a 
referendum, whose results would have a legal effect under the Constitution they have 
proposed. Thus, the prospective "contractual federation" is intended first and foremost 
to grant de jure equal rights to both federation subjects, so that in the future they 
might part legally.  
 
Another core principle of the document developed by Tiraspol is that the subjects' 
rights have a supremacy over the federation's right in matters of mutual interest. 
Obviously, they made sure to list under mutual interest: economy, currency, monetary 
issues, customs, communications, law enforcement, etc. Clearly, what Tiraspol is 
really looking after is to preserve control over customs and Eastern border of 
Moldova; to change the army name into "people's guard" and to keep it under its 
control; to gain the right to issue a certain quota of the "joint state" currency (fact not 
even stipulated in the draft EU Constitution, instead, Belarus does claim to issue 
currency equivalent to its GDP quota in the Russia-Belarus Union); to keep control 
over law enforcement forces; and to hold any kinds of referenda and elections 
separately, so as to be able to manipulate their outcomes.  
 
Generally speaking, it seems that Transdnistrian leaders intended to push 
federalization to its absurd. An illustration of this is the procedure developed for the 
adoption of normative acts by the Federal Parliament. The two chambers of the 
Parliament are to consist not of political parties' factions, but rather of two factions 
including deputies elected on the soil of the two federation subjects. To be adopted, 
legal acts are to be voted by the majority in each of the two territorial factions. 
Another question then rises, what's the use of a Lower Chamber elected according to 
the numerical criteria (1 deputy representing 25,000 citizens), if it does not affect in 
any way the voting outcome (Moldova's electorate is about 2,400,000 and 
Transdnestrian - 700,000). Furthermore, why do we need to spend public funds for a 
federal parliament consisting of two factions formed based on the territorial principle, 
if it may be replaced by the Parliaments of each of the subjects who would examine 
draft laws developed by a legislative center of the joint state?  
 
There are a number of other curiosities in Tiraspol's draft, but what really matters is 
that Tiraspol seeks to obstruct the adoption of a new Constitution in line with OSCE 
draft, thwarting thus the intentions of international organizations, i.e. US and EU, to 
settle the conflict by the end of the year.  
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3. Time and electoral factors  
 
What are the practical reasons for such kind of behavior displayed by Transdnistrian 
leaders? Firstly, the principle guarantor, Russia, is foregoing an electoral campaign 
for State Duma elections in December and then presidential elections in March 2004. 
Analysts pointed three key issues political debates would center around: denigrating 
oligarchs, fighting corruption in law enforcement forces, and patriotic and nostalgic 
citizens' feelings. Having said that, it is very unlikely that Russian authorities would 
dare to pressure Transdnistrian breakaway regime, given that it pursues the same 
agenda, exploiting the nostalgic feelings of Russian speaking citizens. As usual, 
nationalistic Russian political elite would resort to patriotic and expansionist rhetoric. 
An illustration of this is the recent visit in Abhazia of the Chair of the State Duma 
Committee for Foreign Relations, Dmitrii Rogozin. He expressed his support to the 
leaders of the breakaway region and criticism towards Georgia. The fact is that 
currently the Russian "imperial reflexes" could be displayed only in such countries as 
Republic of Moldova and Georgia.  
 
It is very unlikely that EU or US would undertake any uncoordinated actions towards 
settling Transdnistrian conflict or even coercive measures against Transdnistria, given 
that Russian political elite openly promotes Transdnistrian interests. Russian 
representatives expressed on several occasions their disagreements with such 
initiatives of OSCE (Netherlands initiative), US or EU (ban for Transdnistrian leaders 
to enter EU or USA). Their standpoint was made quite clear - Russian interests in 
Transdnistria should be taken into account.  
 
Given this, domestic observers believe that by making public their draft Constitution 
Transdnistrian leaders were in fact seeking to provoke a negative reaction of the 
Moldovan authorities, so as to blame Chisinau, as it usually happens, for rejecting 
Tiraspol's draft without having developed its own at least for the sake of comparison. 
The end goal appears to be to justify the obstruction of the joint constitutional 
commission's activity. Transdnistrian authorities already stated that it might take one 
year to develop the federative Constitution, consequently the conflict wouldn't be 
settled by the end of the year as OSCE and US insisted on. Actions have already been 
taken to justify a possible stay of the Russian troops on the soil of the Republic of 
Moldova after the deadline set for their withdrawal at the Porto OSCE Summit. The 
situation is escalated on purpose so as to infer that only Russia is able to settle. And 
all these efforts only to gain time and discourage EU and US from getting involved 
more actively in the resolution of the conflict.  
 
The second reasoning behind the obstruction of the resolution process is to push the 
negotiation close to the launch of electoral campaign for Moldovan parliamentary 
elections due to start in December 2004. In the past Transdnistrian leaders succeeded 
in getting huge benefits and concessions from the Moldovan side exactly on the eve 
and immediately after elections. This might be explained by the competition among 
the electoral contestants in settling the conflict. This was the case in 1996 when on the 
eve of elections former President Mircea Snegur granted the customs seals of the 
Republic of Moldova to Transdnistria and allowed its foreign trade. Also, Petru 
Lucinski who succeeded to the Presidential seat signed on May 8, 1997 the famous 
Memorandum on establishing a joint state by two equal subjects. The incumbent 
President, Vladmir Voronin, also promised during 2001 electoral campaign that his  
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party would rapidly settle the conflict. In this respect on May 16, 2001 he signed 
together with the Transdnistrian leader a series of documents reconfirming the 
provisions of the 1997 Memorandum. However, several months later he realized that 
Tiraspol leaders had no intention whatsoever to give up on Transdnistria's status as an 
independent state, which might form a confederation with the Republic of Moldova 
for the sole reason of legitimizing and breaking apart afterwards. It was back then that 
Transdnistrian leaders were denied the new customs seals, and the "economic 
blockade" as they like to put it began.  
 
Apparently the upcoming electoral campaign wouldn't be an exception. Leaders of the 
major opposition party, Alliance "Our Moldova", have already voiced their 
disagreement with the actions undertaken by the Communist Party in settling 
Transdnistrian conflict. They established a liaison with Transdnistrian leaders and 
implied that the conflict might be resolved once the Communist Party gets defeated in 
the parliamentary elections. This fact again allows Transdnistrian side some room for 
maneuvers.  
 
In a related note, last year during the electoral campaign for the election of Gagauz-
Yeri Governor, Gheorghe Tabunshik, candidate endorsed by the Communist Party, 
promised to plead for the autonomy to become a subject of the Moldovan federation. 
However, after elections both Tabunshik and the Communist Party suggested that 
granting Gagauz-Yeri the status of federation subject was no longer appropriate. It 
sufficed just to amend the Constitution in order to legalize the status and rights it 
enjoyed. Nevertheless, speculations on federalization played their role. Currently, the 
majority of deputies in Gagauz-Yeri Assembly demand the status of federation 
subject for the autonomy. It is not a coincidence that these claims come on the eve of 
the electoral campaign for elections in Peoples' Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri. Indeed the 
candidates resorting to pro-federalization rhetoric would have higher chances to win 
the race. Consequently Chisinau authorities might end up with a strong pro-federation 
movement in Gagauz-Yeri contesting the concept of "asymmetric federation" founded 
by two subjects, which President Voronin is promoting.  
 
 
4. Opportunities and resources  
 
The confrontation between Chisinau and Tiraspol is ongoing it only varies in its 
intensity. In the last two years the propagandistic war coupled by economic and trade 
measures has reached its climax. In this respect it would be interesting to consider 
how the parties exploit the new opportunities and what are their resources.  
 
For instance Chisinau's resources have been limited, however the favorable 
international conjuncture, i.e. NATO and EU extension, has brought it some benefits, 
namely efforts to settle Transdnistrian conflict were put under international control. It 
so happens that NATO and EU interests to secure the borders with and eliminate the 
conflicts from the neighborhood regions coincide with a particular interest of the 
Republic of Moldova.  
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Tiraspol reacted in an adequate manner. Transdnistrian leaders proceeded to the 
privatization of the public property so that the economic interests of the regional 
separatist elite wouldn't be affected upon an eventual federalization. Also, as usual, 
they exploited "Slavic brotherhood" motives so as to win the support of Russia and 
Ukraine. That's because there are two main factors that ensured Transdnistria's 
existence: a) Russian troops and ammunition dislocated in the region; b) Ukraine's 
tacit consent to the illegal export of Transdnistrian goods through its territory.  
 
Under the resolution of the Istanbul OSCE Summit, Russian troops and munitions had 
to be withdrawn from Transdnistria by the end of 2002. Transdnistrian authorities 
created the necessary conditions for Russian diplomacy to justify the impossibility of 
withdrawing the munitions. A new deadline was set during the Porto Summit, which 
most likely wouldn't be met again. During the 8 months of the year only 1/3 of the 
munitions have been withdrawn. Transdnistrian side precludes the withdrawal of 
munitions on the grounds that Russia failed to comply with the financial 
compensation arrangements agreed upon. This situation resembles another one, the 
document signed by the Republic of Moldova and Russia in 1994 providing for the 
synchronization of munitions withdrawal with granting a legal status to Transdnistria. 
As Transdnistria wished to be an independent state, whereas Russia didn't want to 
withdraw its munitions nothing was solved after all. Nowadays, Russia is still 
interested to keep its military presence in the region as is Transdnistrian 
administration.  
 
As for the second reason that ensured Transdnistria's existence, i.e. Ukraine, it 
underwent some changes. Through the mediation efforts of the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, EU 
managed to convince Ukraine to secure its borders with the Republic of Moldova and 
to allow only the exports of goods bearing the new Moldovan customs seals. In May 
Customs Departments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine signed an agreement 
in this respect. Noteworthy, two years ago President Leonid Kucima refused such an 
agreement, although his Moldovan counterpart insisted on it. Back then Leonid 
Kucima, explained his refusal by the fact that the revenues of some Ukrainian ports 
on the Black Sea come from Transdnistrian exports and that it is paramount to protect 
their interests. In response, President Voronin stated in public that he would endorse 
the Communist Party of Ukraine in the parliamentary elections of March 2002.  
 
At the moment Ukraine's good relations with EU seem to prevail and EU arguments 
seem more convincing. Allegedly, Kucima's new perspective on Ukraine's best 
interests determined Moldovan President to award him "Order of the Republic", the 
highest decoration of the Republic of Moldova, on his 65 anniversary. This allegation 
comes from the fact that last year Russian President, Vladimir Putin received from 
Moldovan President, Vladimir Voronin, only a crystal crocodile for his 50th 
anniversary, celebrated in Chisinau. Afterall, may be Javier Solana, who is due to visit 
Moldova in autumn, is the one to deserve the "Order of the Republic", instead or 
together with Leonid Kucima?  
 
To adequately respond to the "economic and customs blockade" imposed on 
Transdnistria (as Ukraine recognizes only Moldovan Customs seals), Transdnistrian 
leader, Igor Smirnov, decreed a 100% tax on the import of Moldovan goods. At the 
same time he introduced a free trade agreement and preferential trade regime with  
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Ukraine so as to cover the needs of the local market. Moldovan authorities mocked 
those actions and ridiculed Smirnov on the grounds he cannot distinguish between a 
free trade agreement and preferential trade. Apparently Smirnov holds a PhD in 
economics at one of the most prestigious Universities, the Moscow one. He might 
have received it for political rather than scientific reasons, still he should understand 
what a "balance of trade" is and what are the resources needed to cover the deficit. It 
seems that Russia would adequately recompense Transdnistria for the munitions 
already withdrawn from the region. Now it's up to Kucima to decide what does he 
prefer "Order of the Republic of Moldova" or a free trade agreement with 
Transdnistria? That is the more important as the presidential election in Ukraine are 
scheduled for October 2004.  
 
Besides the support they are enjoying, Transdnistrian leaders do not cease to use new 
opportunities. Apparently they have identified a new way of strengthening their 
positions. For instance up till now Tiraspol avoided to synchronize with Chisinau 
certain events, like elections, referenda and the like. However, recently Transdnistrian 
leaders announced they would hold a census in the region simultaneously with that in 
Moldova. How come?  
 
There is only one reasonable explanation to this. Transdnistrian leaders justified the 
separation from the Republic of Moldova by "exercising Transdnistrian people's right 
to self-determination". Obviously, nobody took it seriously. During the 1989 census 
citizens residing in Transdnistria identified themselves as Moldovans, Ukrainians, 
Russians, etc. It then means that the genesis of the "Transdnistrian people" was 
completed only in one year, by 1990, when they declared their separation from 
Moldova. Nowadays, after 13 years of the regime existence, Transdnistrian leaders 
administer all the necessary tools to manipulate public opinion so as to determine 
citizens to identify themselves as Transdnistrians, distinct from Moldovans, Russians, 
Ukrainians, etc. residing on the opposite bank of Dniester river. Synchronization of 
the census on both banks of the Dniester river is intended to confer the event a greater 
legitimacy. This might be regarded as an important step towards implementing the 
provisions of the Transdnistrian draft Constitution of the federative state related to the 
secession right, so as to achieve the principle of "people's right to self-determination".  
While Transdnistrian leaders find all kinds of justifications and resources in order to 
keep afloat, Moldovan authorities miss real opportunities to make the reunification of 
the country attractive to Transdnistrian residents, especially from an economic point 
of view. Transdnistrian propaganda has already spotted the economic problems 
Republic of Moldova is facing, especially given its worsening relations with IMF and 
World Bank. This might be a very serious argument in the propaganda war of 
convincing Transdnistrian citizens that reunification with Moldova will bring no 
good, except for worsening their financial situation.  
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Ideological inconsistency 
19 August 2003  
 
 
During the vacation period Tiraspol was mainly the one to wage the informal war 
with Chisinau. Tiraspol continues to employ the same methods, however with some 
minor innovations. One of the old methods employed are the appeals for support to 
various representatives of Russian elite. Although its effectiveness should not be 
underestimated. For instance, it is believed that Tiraspol won the 1992 conflict with 
Chisinau mainly due to the informational support of the Russian media, including the 
democratic and reformist one. For years Tiraspol managed to secure an open support 
of a considerable part of the Russian political elite in State Duma that shares 
revanchist and xenophobic ideals. However the most significant support to Tiraspol 
has come from the executive power in Russia, that secured protection in various fields 
and enabled economic development of the region, while entrapping Chisinau and 
decoying it in all kinds of "vicious circles". Russian intelligentsia as well as religious 
elite has played a role on this matter. To cite just the numerous scientific and religious 
awards that the separatist leader Igor Smirnov received, among others from the 
Patriarch Alexei II himself. All those awards were granted in appreciation of the 
"patriotic" efforts undertaken to establish a breakaway regime on the "Russian land" 
of Transdnistria.  
 
None of the previous governing of the Republic of Moldova has had a chance of 
winning Russia's support in settling the Transdnistrian crisis, even though some of 
them enjoyed good relations with Russian political elite. One of the parties enjoying a 
real support in Moldova, the Communist Party, has had a standout approach towards 
the settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict. It may be reduced to the pledge to 
contribute to rebuilding Soviet Union and within its framework settle Transdnistrian 
conflict. To this end the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova adhered to and 
is still a member of the Union of Communist Parties - Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (UCP-CPSS). In short the expectations of the Moldovan Communists were as 
follows: Communist and internationalist ideas of the former URSS would prevail over 
revanchist and nationalist ideas of the new elite.  
 
In this respect, as Transdnistrian leaders' intentions to be "the last bastion of the soviet 
type Communism" were in line with statutory goals of the Communist Party of 
Moldova, the latter sought to justify the breakaway regime and engaged in criticizing 
previous governments' efforts to settle the conflict.  
 
The way political landscape evolved in 10 years since the breakup of the URSS had 
slightly changed the Communist Party ideology. If we are to consider the quality of 
the party press, then from a theoretical and ideological point of view, the Communist 
Party hasn't evolved too far from the pro-Communist electronic publication 
"Bumbarash". From a practical point of view, the Communist Party didn't find 
anything better than to reiterate in its political program adopted at the April 2001 
Congress (immediately after their victory in parliamentary elections) the same pledge 
to build the communist society in line with the Marxist-Leninist ideology and to 
rebuild URSS via the UCP-CPSS. It should be mentioned also that at that time the 
"destruction of the socialist motherland" was much deplored.  
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On the other hand, pragmatic leaders from Transdnistria changed the justification for 
their separatism a couple of times, i.e. from the "bastion of the soviet communism", to 
"promoter of Russia's interests in the Balkans", and finally to the more pragmatic 
reasons - their own economic interests. Privatization of the public patrimony has 
become a major tool in safeguarding those interests.  
 
Having said that, it comes as no surprise that the impetuous collaboration between the 
Communist governing and breakaway regime lasted just a couple of months after the 
communist victory in February elections. It was followed by a tough and precarious 
confrontation lasting to this day. Consequently, Communist authorities had to revise 
their priorities. In his speech made on the 10th anniversary of Republic of Moldova, 
August 27, 2001, President Voronin stated that consolidating the independence of the 
Moldovan state was a top priority, forgetting, thus, about the program of his own 
party. One year later, Republic of Moldova integration into another Union than the 
soviet one, namely European Union, has become a priority. One could only wonder 
about such an impressive metamorphosis. Nonetheless, credibility has become an 
issue.  
 
Indeed, Transdnistria has undergone some spectacular transformations. One is for 
sure, it remained "Russia's trustworthy partner" and promoter of Russia's interests, 
thus justifying its sole existence. No wonder the ideological babble vanished once the 
real interests of the new Moldovan Communist authorities and old Transdnistrian 
administration clashed.  
 
And here comes the innovative methods employed by the Transdnistrian leaders. 
Currently they are exerting an influence over Moldovan authorities by pulling the 
strings in Moscow, i.e. UCP-CPSS. Recently the official Transdnistrian press has 
published the appeal of the Plenary Council of the UCP-CPSS entitled "Let's Join Our 
Efforts to Revive Our Motherland". Authors of the document call the governments, 
Communist parties and movements in the former URSS republics to recognize 
Transdnistria' independence that is "a trustworthy ally of Russia and an active 
promoter of rebuilding URSS", but which currently undergoes genocide. At least 
formally, the appeal is addressed among others to the governing party of the Republic 
of Moldova. According to the UCP-CPSS, USA poses a great threat to Transdnistria 
as it intends to settle the conflict by force.  
 
Of course the appeal as well as the UCP-CPSS itself may be ignored. After all, what 
can we expect from an organization headed by one of the ideologists of the August 
1991 putsch, namely Oleg Shenin, Chair of the Council Steering Committee. This 
Shenin is a rather dubious character. An illustration of this are his numerous 
comments on Russia's enemies such as: "we do understand what fascism, religious 
fundamentalism, and Islamic fundamentalism is, but what we fail to understand is 
what Zionism is?!"  
 
No wonder that characters like this support Transdnistria. Liberal Jirinovski and 
others of the like, is another sample. At any rate, it is rather annoying that such an 
organization made up of "principled Communists" prefers to support a breakaway and 
illegal regime as Transdnistria is, which on top of everything pleads for the land 
privatization (!), rather than a democratically elected Moldovan communist regime, 
which publicly opposes land privatization. There is only one reasonable explanation -  
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ideology is nothing but a "trap for stupids" for Russian Communists, what really 
matters for them, as well as for other elite circles, is "the reunification of Russian 
territories".  
 
The only issue here is whether it should come as a surprise that after all Moldovan 
governing party is still a member of the UCP-CPSS! And this especially after the 
Moldovan communist leaders named EU integration as a top priority, or after they 
condemned anti-Semitism.  
 
One may only wonder how the representatives of the Moldovan Communist Party 
would feel at the UCP-CPSS reunions, especially as they are inaugurated by the 
anthem of the URSS whose lyrics was written by the "leading intellectual" - Serghei 
Mihalkov. The thing is that recently the declaration of the Russian writers headed by 
Serghei Mihalkov was published in Transdnistria, condemning Voronin's regime and 
acclaiming the regime of Igor Smirnov "laureate of Sholohov award". This is another 
evidence to the effect that for Russian intelligentsia, which may serve any regime in 
order to contribute to the greatness of their Motherland, what happened in 
Transdnistria, Chechnya, Abhazia, and the like, and most importantly why it 
happened is of little or no relevance at all. What really matters for them is that in the 
said regions Russia might show off its greatness, regardless of the methods employed. 
If the intelligentsia was to inquire on the details of the 1992 provocation at the Bender 
Police Station, then Dostoevski's "Demons" would seem mere dilettantes when 
compared to those who contrived "complicity through the bloodshed" in order to 
justify later on the existence of the breakaway regime. The celebrations of the 13th 
anniversary of the Transdnistrian regime on September 2, would be another occasion 
for them to invoke the bloodshed.  
 
For the sake of comparison, it is worth mentioning that although nothing provoked the 
operation "of reinforcing constitutional order" in Chechnya back in 1995, on the 
contrary it succeeded in taking the breakaway regime by surprise, Russian elite 
refrained from condemning it. Needless to say it happened after the Bender tragedy 
and after Moldovan authorities had been condemned for "reinforcing constitutional 
order". This is another example of Russian elite's principledness. It would be unfair to 
allege that Russian elite is made up only of the said characters, it also includes 
Serghei Kovaliov, Elena Bonner, and the like. Unfortunately, though, Moldovan 
communist authorities share a different ideology from them.  
 
Negative trend in the electoral process 
25 August 2003  
 
 
In mid-August the final report of the OSCE observation mission, Report on Local 
Elections in Moldova, was posted on the its official website. The report was 
accompanied by a note, entitled "Negative trend observed during Moldova's local 
elections must be reversed". This negative trend observed in the electoral process has 
been a source of concern for OSCE Observation Mission, especially given 
considerable progress made in the previous elections. Steven Wagenseil, Deputy 
Director of OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights called on 
Moldovan authorities to undertake every effort to correct the negative trend.  
 
On the one hand, the report notes that the administration of the elections, the legal 
framework and voting procedures, as well as the activity of the Central Electoral 
Commission and election officials at all the levels were generally in accordance with 
OSCE commitments. However, those achievements had been shadowed by the 
abusive behavior displayed by the authorities.  
 
The report identifies a number of shortcomings in the conduct of elections, such as 
heavily biased and distorted reporting by the state media, interference by the 
authorities in the election process by arresting or threatening to arrest opposition 
candidates, as well as misuse of public resources for campaign purposes. This refers 
also to the electoral staff of the Chisinau Mayor, Serafim Urechean, the main 
opposition candidate.  
 
Experts point that the integrity of the electoral process was undermined by the latest 
amendments to the Law on Political Parties imposing rather exaggerated requirements 
for the party registration. The amendments also infringe on data protection, as they 
require for provision of comprehensive personal data for each party member. Another 
source of concern has been the citizens' lack of confidence in courts and other 
institutions, the relatively low number of appeals being a relevant indication in this 
respect. In general the complaints mainly focussed on allegation of misuse of public 
resources for campaign purposes or on obstruction of opposition campaigning. This 
mainly refers to the overzealous enforcement of public security by police. OSCE 
report also reports on payment of bonuses to certain categories of population on 
certain occasions. Those practices should be forbidden as they disadvantage 
opposition candidates, which cannot afford to employ them. The report also outlines 
the case of the National House of Social Insurance that distributed humanitarian food 
aid, which reportedly included Communist Party campaign material. However the 
surprise of the recent campaign was that the Communist Party, which had violated the 
most legal provisions and largely engaged in electoral corruption, filled the greatest 
number of complaints. They are probably the only ones to trust the Moldovan 
judiciary.  
 
Although the OSCE report covers extensively the positive and negative aspects of the 
electoral process, it is worth considering in detail the recommendations offered for 
consideration of Moldovan authorities in order to remedy the negative trend observed 
during the last elections. Those refer in particular to the following: CEC should be 
authorized to impose administrative sanctions for non-compliance with its orders or  
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decisions; entire system of voter registration should be revised. It is recommended to 
create a Civil Register, a data base accessible to all electoral bodies for them to be 
able to correctly compile voter lists. In the previous elections the number of voters 
included in supplementary voter lists was up to 10%. However in the recent local 
elections 7.4% of the voters were included in the supplementary lists in the first 
round, and 4.9% in the second - a conclusive indication to the fact that things were not 
changing for the better.  
 
A special attention was given in the OSCE report to mass media coverage of 
elections. The recommendations include among others: making the free air time more 
ample; broadcasters should be encouraged to provide contestants with equitable 
debate conditions for the voters to decide on their own which of the contestants are 
more competent.  
 
In addition broadcasters should not provide members of the government who are also 
candidates with extensive media coverage during news programs. The latter should 
provide neutral and impartial election coverage, whereas matters directly or indirectly 
related to elections should be debated during shows specifically assigned to it. 
Furthermore, the public should be informed if a message is a paid political 
advertisement.  
 
As for campaign finance, it was also covered in the report. It was recommended to 
impose sanctions in case of non-compliance with the law, as well as to have in place 
audit and control mechanisms.  
 
In conclusion, one may assume that both representatives of the governing party as 
well as opposition parties are very much familiar with the flaws of the Republic of 
Moldova electoral system. Civic organizations of Moldova working in the field of 
elections have repeatedly raised the shortcomings mentioned in the OSCE report. The 
fact is that numerous parties, which stayed in power exploited the shortcomings to 
their own advantage. This is the only reasonable explanation for the total lack of 
sanctions, such as suspension of the candidate registration, for the repeated violation 
of the law. And this because, parties in power had enjoyed greater opportunities to 
violate the law and to avoid sanctions. This is especially true with regard to the 
incumbent ruling party, which in the two and a half years of its rule has been 
constantly advocating for improving Moldova's image abroad, while itself bringing 
the greatest detriment to the image of the country through its actions, especially as far 
as elections are concerned - fact reported in the OSCE report as well.  
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